Everyday impunity in Myanmar, lessons from Bangladesh by Cheesman, Nick
2016-9-13
Everyday impunity in Myanmar, lessons from Bangladesh
blogs.lse.ac.uk /southasia/2016/09/13/everyday-impunity-in-myanmar-lessons-from-bangladesh/
Conditions in Myanmar have changed sufficiently over the last few years to enable people to challenge
everyday impunity in a way that would not previously have been possible. Nevertheless, Nick
Cheesman draws on the case of Bangladesh to point to obstacles to aggrieved persons seeking
redress for state violence. The continued political and economic power of Myanmar’s armed forces
coupled with a corresponding absence of institutionalised legal avenues mean long-term structural
changes will be key to successfully redressing grievances against state officers.
Writing in Paper Cadavers, Kirsten Weld observes that after the end of armed conflict and
dictatorship in Guatemala,
“The military remained an influential source of political and financial clout, and a reconstituted police
force only exacerbated its predecessors’ reputation for viciousness and corruption. Impunity reigned;
everyday violence, sometimes perpetrated by state security forces, terrorised and distracted the
population.”
Weld might very well have been writing about Myanmar today. With the election of a National League for Democracy
government in 2015, overt political oppression has become a thing of the past. Nevertheless, soldiers continue to
enjoy impunity for killing and torture in frontier regions, and the army quietly maintains its presence in practically all
areas of political and economic life. Policemen, meanwhile, target the urban poor in response to a purported crime
wave.
Myanmar’s five decades of experience with military rule might have been unusually protracted and peculiarly
damaging, but in its general terms it is hardly unique. Among the country’s neighbours, both Bangladesh and
Thailand have economically powerful and politically active armies. In each, military governments have engendered
conditions of everyday impunity that have outlasted their administrations—conditions making it all but impossible for
ordinary citizens to hold state officers to account for criminal acts, whether committed in the course of regular duties
or in their private lives.
Additionally, Bangladesh has a history of British colonial occupation in common with Myanmar, hitherto Burma, and
many of the two countries’ postcolonial institutions and juridical practices bear a striking resemblance. But whereas
in Bangladesh military, paramilitary and civilian institutions have had to compete with one another for access to
political and economic resources, in Myanmar, up until recently the army aggrandised its own institutions and
personnel to the exclusion of others.
Times have changed, and Myanmar’s political transformation would appear to be bringing it closer politically, at least
in terms of the role and place of the military and its proxies, to Bangladesh. If so, what can be learned from the
experiences with everyday impunity of people in Bangladesh that might be instructive for their counterparts in
Myanmar?
For one thing, vigorous electoral politics, civilian-led government and a vibrant media and civil society clearly do not
necessarily suffice to make state officers accountable for criminal violence. In Bangladesh, an admixture of official
unwillingness and inability to hold soldiers, police and paramilitaries to account for violent crimes has left the
population vulnerable. Some state programs, initiated in the name of counterterrorism and national security, have
made people far less secure than they would otherwise have been.
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Police crackdown on student protesters in Latpantann, March 2015. Credit: Burma Democratic Concern CC BY 2.0
One of the most visible manifestations of impunity in Bangladesh is the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), an elite
anticrime and counterterror unit consisting of military and police personnel. Ever since its establishment in March
2004, RAB has operated virtually outside the purview of the law. According to Human Rights Watch, RAB was
allegedly involved in more than 550 killings between 2004 and 2009 alone. Local human rights groups have
documented in excess of a thousand killings.
Observing RAB getting away with murder, the police adopted the same methods, and hundreds of killings have
since been attributed to them as well. Children, journalists, labour rights advocates, political activists, unarmed
protesters and disadvantaged civilians have all become victims of so-called crossfires and faked encounters with
alleged criminals or terrorists. Others who have survived potentially lethal attacks have, as is also the case in
Myanmar, been made the targets of concocted criminal charges.
For another thing, everyday impunity in Bangladesh results not so much from formal provisions to protect
perpetrators of the sort that are associated with large-scale amnesties for state-sponsored atrocities, or not only
from such provisions, but rather from archaic regulatory arrangements that serve to protect soldiers and police from
prosecution. Even after allegations of extrajudicial killings have been confirmed, perpetrators are at most punished
with dishonorable discharge.
Many of these arrangements Myanmar inherited together with Bangladesh from British colonisers. Today, both
countries want for institutions that ensure rigorous inquiry and fair adjudication of suspected ordinary offenders in
regular cases, let alone when state officers are the accused. The poor quality of investigation, lack of procedural
fairness and, in Bangladesh especially, trial delays all present obstacles to survivors of state violence or family
members seeking justice.
Evidently, if the political changes in Myanmar give cause for optimism then the lessons from Bangladesh
recommend the optimism be cautious. Conditions in Myanmar have changed sufficiently to enable people to say
and do things in response to everyday impunity that they would not have been able to say or do just a few years
ago. These changed conditions are encouraging more and more people to voice grievances, and are also raising
expectations of redress.
In some cases, expectations are at least partly realised. But the continued political and economic power of
Myanmar’s armed forces coupled with a corresponding absence of trustworthy, institutionalised legal avenues to
have grievances heard and addressed all but guarantees that the struggle against everyday military impunity in
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Myanmar will be protracted and difficult. While not neglecting opportunities for short-term gains, human rights
defenders there will also need to direct their energies towards long-term structural changes, absent of which
impunity will remain a part of everyday life in Myanmar, as it is in Bangladesh.
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